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Project Manager, SSI
Abstract
Several major applications for commercial and 
government markets have developed recently which 
will make use of small satellites. A launch 
vehicle designed specifically for small satellites 
brings many attendant benefits. Space Services 
Incorporated has developed the Conestoga family of 
launch vehicles to meet the needs of five major 
markets: low orbiting communication satellites, 
positioning satellites, earth sensing satellites, 
space manufacturing prototypes, and scientific 
experiments. The Conestoga provides low cost, 
rapid schedules, one-stop shopping, flexible 
launch sites, multiple satellite deployments, 
insurability, reliability, and modularity.
I. Background
Space Services Incorporated (SSI) was established 
in 1980. The founder, David Hannah, Jr., intended 
to develop a small launch vehicle to serve a 
developing sector of space commercialization, the 
small satellite market. At the time, Mr. Hannah 
envisioned this market developing out of a trend 
toward miniaturized components, a need for lower 
cost space systems, and a mass-production concept 
for small satellites which would allow for 
economies of scale.
After an initial difficulty with a liquid-fueled 
rocket system, the company switched to a more 
dependable, solid-fueled design. In September, 
1982, the company successfully launched the 
Conestoga I. Subsequently, a series of Conestoga 
vehicles have been developed to service the 300 to 
4000 pound payload range for launch to low earth 
orbit.
The Conestoga I mission was a suborbital launch 
from Matagorda Island, Texas. The trajectory took 
the vehicle 192 nautical miles up and 350 nautical 
miles down range. The vehicle was powered by a 
Minuteman M56 motor. Although the technology 
demonstration was important for the company, 
proving its ability to organize and conduct 
launches, it was not a significant technical 
advance for aerospace engineering. For the launch 
industry, however, it was unprecedented. It was 
the first privately funded, privately operated
launch into space. As such, it represents an 
important precedent for all other space launch 
companies.
In order to conduct the launch, the company 
solicited and received approvals from 18 different 
Federal agencies. Among these were the Air Force, 
the State Department, the Navy, and the Commerce 
Department. Commerce required SSI to obtain an 
export license, due to the extra-territoriality of 
the vehicle's splashdown point.
Since that time, the company has organized a team 
of subcontractors to develop the Conestoga family 
of vehicles and conduct upcoming launches. The 
team includes Eagle Engineering, a Houston-based 
engineering and design firm, and Morton Thiokol, a 
nationally recognized aerospace contractor.
Recently, the company signed an agreement with 
NASA for the use of Wallops Flight Facility in 
Virginia as a long term launch site. Also, SSI 
has obtained financial backing from Houston 
Industries, the parent company of Houston Lighting 
and Power, and has agreed to provide five launches 
to Starfind, Incorporated.
II. Markets
In any business, it is logical to analyze the 
market before designing a product. Therefore, 
before discussing the launch vehicles which SSI 
has developed, let's look at the markets it is 
intended to serve.
Broadly, the market is divided into two segments. 
The commercial segment is concerned with 
profitable satellite operations, short-term 
development, and high return on investment. The 
government segment is concerned with budgetary 
constraints, long-term development, high 
reliability, and political advantage. Clearly, to 
design a single vehicle to meet the needs of both 
market segments is challenging.
Within each of these segments, five major 
applications have been identified. These are low 
orbiting networks of communications satellites, 
positioning or navigation systems, earth sensing 
systems, space manufacturing prototypes, and 






applications benefits from the use of smaller 
satellites.
Small satellites have several advantages.
1. They can be as capable as their larger 
counterparts. Miniaturization of 
components has allowed increasingly 
sophisticated circuitry to occupy less 
volume and weight.
2. Smaller satellites can cost less, both 
to develop and to launch. Small 
components weigh less, are often 
easier to mass produce, and frequently 
come "off-the-shelf."
3. Smaller satellites are easier to 
insure, simply because they cost less. 
With less at risk, insurance companies 
can afford lower premiums.
4. Smaller satellites offer increased 
survivability and decreased capacity 
risk. Individually, a small satellite 
is less of a target. As a network 
with many interconnected elements, a 
group of small satellites in different 
orbits can continue to provide 
capacity despite the loss of one or 
two elements.
5. Smaller satellites are more easily 
replaced. With lower production and 
launch costs, it is easier to have 
spare satellites in inventory, ready 
to replace defective or destroyed 
satellites. This replaceability 
removes the burden of high cost, 
highly reliable components which make 
many long-lived spacecraft so 
expensive.
Together these benefits provide sufficient 
incentive to satellite operators to reconsider the 
use of traditional, large, long-lived, expensive 
systems. A growing trend toward small satellites 
has been seen, with certain government users 
leading the way.
The analysis of the market suggests the 
characteristics that a launch vehicle should 
possess.
1. Its total purchase price should be 
low. The price is particularly 
important in view of the Government's 
need to meet budgetary constraints, 
and the commercial sector's need to 
provide a high return on investment. 
Dollars saved at launch return 
directly to the "bottom line" of the 
satellite operator.
2. It should have a broad range of 
capabilities. Modular components, 
such as strap-on motors and a variety 
of upper stages could provide such a 
range. Therefore, a single vehicle is 
not sufficient; a family of vehicles 
is needed.
3. A commercial approach is needed. A 
commercial approach is characterized 
by reduced manpower and paperwork 
requirements, good quality control, 
fixed price contracts, and turnkey 
launch services. The commercial 
operator pays for the development 
cost, rather than having the customer 
(government) pay for it. Commercial 
customers find such an approach 
attractive because it is familiar and 
dependable. Commercial clients of the 
government, for instance shuttle 
users, often fail to evaluate the 
risks associated with a supplier whose 
policies are not determined by the 
market. Government launch vehicle 
users find a commercial approach 
politically advantageous at present 
due to the attitude of the current 
Administration. Certain laws require 
the use of commercial launch services 
where possible.
4. The launch system should have limited 
risk factors. Use of flight-proven 
components and experienced contractors 
could provide a significantly less 
risky vehicle. Such an approach 
offers advantages in insurance, 
reliability, and cost. Advanced 
designs can be both more costly to 
develop and more costly to operate.
III. Options
Currently, small satellite operators are faced 
with many options for launching their payloads. 
Unfortunately, most of these are unappealing.
A. Space Shuttle.
In August, 1986, President Reagan signed an 
Executive Order requiring the removal of 
commercial payloads from the shuttle. Even 
without this policy (which, after all, is subject 
to change without notice), the shuttle has 
inherent disadvantages for the small satellite 
user. These include:
1, Long lead time to launch. Even prior 
to the Challenger tragedy, lead times 
for payload operators could be 
lengthy. Integration time, especially 
for space available payloads which 
must be ready for integration on any 
of several flights, could be long. 
This waiting period is particularly 
unfortunate for experimenters with 
biological or other perishable 
materials.
Tight Manifest. With the down-time 
associated with the loss of 51L, an 
increasing backlog has accumulated. 
Today, a new payload for the shuttle 
faces a wait of years, even assuming a 









3 Inflexibility. The shuttle has 
limited capabilities. It cannot reach 
altitudes higher than a few hundred 
nautical miles, and it cannot reach 
all inclinations. Small satellites 
with special orbital needs must expect 
a shuttle launch to take them only 
part of the way; the final orbital 
insertion must be accomplished with an 
additional propulsion unit.
4 Man-rating. One cost associated with 
a manned system is the valid 
requirement that no payload pose a 
threat to the astronauts. 
Demonstrating this harmlessness can be 
impose a significant cost on a low- 
cost satellite's budget.
B. Titan, Delta, Atlas, Ariane, CZ-3.
These launch systems are expensive and poorly 
suited to smaller spacecraft. The Titan III, 
Delta, and Atlas were designed for much larger 
payloads and have correspondingly high prices. 
The European Ariane and Chinese CZ-3 have unique 
problems associated with all foreign launchers. 
National security issues virtually rule out their 
use for U.S. Government launches. Foreign 
launchers impose added costs to commercial users 
due to export licensing. As well, technology 
transfer questions may limit their use. 
Technology transfer questions seem to have 
prevented the use of Soviet launch vehicles.
C. The Scout.
The Scout is an expensive launch system for the 
capability it provides. Those currently in 
inventory are probably not available for use 
outside the Navy, which has possession and intends 
to use them for its Transit program.
As currently configured, the Scout has limited 
capabilities, providing less than 500 pounds to 
low earth orbits. The Scout also lacks a modern 
guidance system, giving it limited accuracy. 
Since the Algol III motor used by Scout is out of 
production, it is likely that the configuration 
will change. Use of the available Castor motor 
and other solid upper stages would yield a vehicle 
surprisingly like the SSI Conestoga.
Even with a new configuration, the Scout suffers 
from lack of a commercial approach. The 
manufacturer is unlikely to make the Scout 
available on a commercial basis without a 
reasonable base of production guaranteed by a 
government procurement. Experience has shown that 
procured systems tend to be high in cost and late 
in schedule.
D. Refurbished Missile Boosters.
The government has retired several of its missile 
systems, notably the Minuteman and Polaris. 
Motors from these and other missiles may be 
available for certain government launches. 
However, the limited inventory that does exist 
seems to have already been fully committed. Such 
boosters are probably not available for commercial 
systems. As well, they have very limited 
capabilities. Due to their age, many are 
unreliable, and a certain proportion of those that 
Pass inspection are likely to fail. Although
current cost estimates for such systems are low, 
such cost estimates are historically lower than 
the actual cost of procurement and operation.
IV. The Conestoga
Faced with a clear market need which was not being 
satisfactorily met by any existing launch system, 
SSI developed the Conestoga family of launchers.
A. The Team.
The Conestoga team is composed of SSI, Eagle 
Engineering and Norton Thiokol. SSI provides 
project management, in-house engineering, quality 
control, marketing and financing. SSI's technical 
team is headed by Deke Slayton, who led the 
Conestoga I team to a successful launch. Eagle 
Engineering provides mission analysis, vehicle 
design, and additional engineering expertise as 
needed, much as they did on the Conestoga I 
flight. Morton Thiokol provides Star motors for 
upper stages through its Elkton, Maryland 
division, and Castor motors for lower stages 
through its Huntsville, Alabama division. Also, 
Thiokol 's Wasatch, Utah, division, is developing 
the company's thrust vector control (TVC) system 
for use on the Castor motors.
B. The Components.
The main elements of the Conestoga family of 
boosters are its motors. Other important elements 
are the payload fairing, interstages, TVC system, 
guidance/navigation and control system, and 
aerodynamic elements such as nose cones and 
skirts. Figure 1 shows a Conestoga IA with an 
orbital capability of over 500 pounds. The motor 
stack uses a Castor V as the first stage, a half- 
length Castor V as the second stage, and a Star 37 
FM as the third and final stage.
The Castor V is a 50 inch diameter, solid fueled 
motor similar to those used as strap-ons for the 
Delta rocket. The Castor has a thirty year 
development history. Over that period, over 1700 
Castor motors have been fired with only two 
failures. Each of the Castor V motors used in the 
Conestoga will be equipped with a TVC actuator 
system using flex-seal nozzles. This system will 
provide for control of the vehicle during powered 
flight. The first stage motor uses a nozzle with 
an 8:1 expansion ratio, with a higher ratio for 
upper stages operating above most of the 
atmosphere.
The Star 37 FM is one of a family of upper stage 
motors. Star motors are defined by their 
diameters, with the Star 37 having a 37 inch 
diameter. The range goes as low as the Star 17, 
with a 17 inch diameter. One potential upgrade 
for the Conestoga design is to include TVC on the 
Star upper stages, providing greater accuracy for 
final insertion.
Figure 2 shows a Conestoga II/3-2. This vehicle 
is similar to the Conestoga IA, with two 
additional Castor V motors as strap-ons. These 
motors increase the payload capacity of the 
vehicle to over 1000 pounds to a 150 nautical mile 
orbit.
Figure 3 shows a Conestoga IV. This vehicle is 
designed for the launch of geosynchronous 
satellites. It adds four more strap-ons to the 
Conestoga II design, with an additional upper 
stage. The first stage consists of these four
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strap-ons which are dropped at an altitude of some 
400,000 feet. The second stage is the two 
remaining strap-on motors. The third stage is the 
remaining full Castor, with the fourth stage being 
a half-length Castor. These four stages can lift 
about 4000 pounds to 150 nautical miles. In a 
geosynchronous mission, the Star 37FM acts as a 
perigee kick motor, and the Star 27 is used as an 
apogee kick motor. The payload deployed at 
geosynchronous can weigh as much as 595 pounds.
C. Capabilities.
The Conestoga family of vehicles provides launch 
capacity for payloads weighing 300 to 4000 pounds. 
It is available for the full range of orbital 
inclinations. Conestogas can deploy 2500 pounds 
to a 450 nautical mile, sun synchronous orbit, 595 
pounds to geosynchronous, and 4000 pounds to a 150 
nautical mile, 38 degree inclination orbit.
Conestoga vehicles can be launched from a number 
of launch sites. Customers with particular 
preferences can be accommodated at any existing 
site. In addition, the campaign style of 
operation used by SSI allows for the development 
and use of new launch sites.
The company has an agreement with NASA for the use 
of the Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia. 
Wallops has been used in the past as a site for 
launching Scouts and sounding rockets. The 
company is awaiting the "Air Force Model ELV 
Commercialization Agreement" before pursuing the 
use of Vandenberg Air Force Base for polar 
launches. Other existing sites under 
consideration include White Sands Missile Range, 
and the San Marco platform in Kenya.
Undeveloped sites which have been considered by 
SSI include Matagorda Island, the site of the 
company's first two launch campaigns, Cat Island 
in Mississippi, and South Point, Hawaii. Such 
sites offer some advantages of location, either 
improved logistics or better launch 
characteristics.
D. Advantages.
The Conestoga family of vehicles provides many 
advantages to the small satellite operator.
1. Low cost. Conestogas range in price 
from $10 to $25 million. The total 
price of a Conestoga launch is lower 
for any given payload weight than 
other launch systems now available.
2. Accelerated schedule. With certain 
vehicle elements now available, the 
schedule from contract signing to 
launch can be as short as 15 months. 
Normal schedules for Conestoga are as 
short as 18 months.
3. Turnkey launch services. Conestoga 
launch services provide delivery to 
orbit. Procured vehicles systems 
generally provide vehicle hardware 
delivered to a warehouse. Turnkey 
launch services provide one-stop 
shopping, with more accurate pricing.
4. Campaign Approach. As mentioned, 
SSI's campaign approach allows the use 
of diverse launch sites.
Multiple satellite deployment. Figure 
4 shows SSI's multiple satellite 
deployment system, capable of 
deploying up to six Get Away Special 
sized satellites at once. This system 
can bring down the per spacecraft 
launch cost to very low levels.
Insurability. SSI's insurance broker, 
Corroon and Black has assured the 
company of the availability of 
insurance for Conestoga launches, for 
payloads deployed by Conestoga, and 
for third party liability coverage. 
Due to the expected reliability of the 
system, insurance premiums are 
expected to be low. In addition, the 
company offers reflight insurance for 
a fee.
7. Reliability. Use of flight-proven 
components and established designs 
helps increase the reliability of the 
system. New approaches are being 
considered for advanced Conestoga 
designs, but the current designs 
benefit from using well-proven 
technology.
8. Modular Design. Using strap-on motors 
to increase lift capacity limits the 
design risk associated with the larger 
vehicles. This approach has been used 
successfully in many other rocket 
programs, notably the Titan series and 
the Delta series.
V. Conclusion
Small satellites have unique needs which make the 
use of most available launch systems inappropriate 
at best. These difficulties can be surmounted 
through the use of a commercially available 
vehicle, the Conestoga. Various Conestogas are 
available to provide launch services to any orbit 
for a wide range of payloads. The use of such as 
system can provide low cost access to space for 
many applications.
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